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Appellee files this Brief in response to the issues 
raised by Appellant. 
STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION 
Appellee admits jurisdiction of this Court as alleged 
by Appellant herein under Section 78-2a-3(2)(i), U.C., 1995, as 
an appeal from a final order. 
STATEMENT OFISSUES FOR RESPONSE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court properly awarded attorney's fees 
to Appellee. The Standard of Review is whether there was an 
abuse of discretion in the award. 
2. Whether Appellant's income was properly assessed. 
The standard of review is whether there was clearly an erroneous 
finding of fact. 
3. Whether the Appellee's need for employment and her 
continued employment was anticipated at the time of Decree. The 
standard of review is whether there was clearly an erroneous 
finding of fact. 
4. Whether there was a substantial change of 
circumstances in Appellant's income. The standard of review is 
whether the ruling was an abuse of discretion. Not only whether 
there was substantial change of circumstance but also whether the 
circumstances were anticipated by the parties at the time of 
Decree of Divorce. 
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5. Whether part of Appellant's wife's income was 
properly considered as part of Appellant's income. The standard 
of review is whether there was a clearly erroneous finding of 
fact. 
6. Whether denial of a Motion for New Trial was 
supported by the evidence. The standard of review is whether the 
petitioner presented any new evidence which would give rise to a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact or an abuse of discretion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Issue of attorney's fees: 
1. At the initial hearing Appellee proffered evidence 
as to attorney's fees and offered to present evidence under oath. 
(Tr. pp. 310 and 548-549.) 
2. Appellant acknowledged the proffer and made no 
request for testimony or evidence to be presented. (Tr. pp. 310, 
549 and 562-563 . ) 
3. Appellant made no request to cross-examine any 
testimony and accepted the proffer as though the same were made 
under oath. (Tr. pp. 310 and 54 9.) 
4. At the hearing on Motion for New Trial, Appellee's 
attorney provided testimony and was subject to cross-examination. 
(Tr. pp. 568-574.) 
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5. The attorney's fees claimed are reasonable and 
Appellant is in need of assistance to pay those fees, and 
Appellant is able to meet those expenses. (Tr. p. 310.) 
Issue of Income: 
1. Appellant's income at the time of Decree was 
$45,000 per year. (Tr. pp. 273 and 309.) 
2. Appellant voluntarily terminated his employment 
which he had at the time of Decree but he did not adversely 
affect his financial position. (Tr. pp. 310, 456, 486, 487 and 
552. ) 
3. Appellant accepted employment to be a long haul 
driver with his wife. (Tr. pp. 309 and 457.) 
4. Appellant received a mileage rate of pay and a per 
diem allowance. His wife received a mileage rate of pay for the 
same miles and a per diem allowance for the same days. (Tr. pp. 
310 and 469.) 
5. Appellant's income was augmented by his wife's 
mileage and per diem allowance which together, on an annualized 
basis, is $75,000 per year. (Tr. p. 554.) Appellant's own 
income is at least $36,000 per year plus an additional amount 
allocable to him because of his wife's income as a team driver. 
(Tr. pp. 310, 478-479 and 553.) 
Issue of Appellee's Employment: 
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1. The parties anticipated that Appellant was 
employed or would be employed at the time of Decree in a part-
time employment. (Tr. pp. 273-274, 309, 424, 444 and 458.) 
2. The parties knew that Appellee could not live on 
the $3 00 per month alimony which the parties agreed would be 
paid. (Tr. pp. 274, 309 and 552.) 
3. Without the alimony payment, defendant is in 
arrears in meeting her expenses every month. (Tr. p. 440.) 
4. The parties anticipated that Appellee would 
continue her employment and could anticipate an increase in 
income. (Tr. pp. 276 and 441.) 
Issue of Appellant's Wife's Income: 
1. Appellant's wife receives expense and per diem 
allowances in addition to mileage payment for team driving with 
Appellant. (Tr. pp. 275-276.) 
2. Appellant's income is based in part upon his team 
driving with his wife. (Tr. p. 275.) 
3. Appellant and his wife each receive the same 
payment for mileage, per diem and expense reimbursement. (Tr. p. 
276. ) 
4. Appellant's wife's income is based in part upon 
Appellant's experience and expertise. (Tr. p. 275.) 
Issue of Motion for New Trial: 
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1. Appellant neither produced nor alleged any new 
evidence in his Motion for New Trial. (Tr. p. 277.) 
2. The trial court reviewed the existing evidence and 
the law based upon the Motion for New Trial and found no grounds 
for granting the motion. (Tr. p. 277.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant has failed to demonstrate a material and 
substantial change of circumstances upon which a Modification of 
Decree of Divorce could be based. The determination of income is 
based upon Appelant's testimony and there are good and sufficient 
grounds for the Findings of Fact made by the Court. The award of 
attorney's fees was based upon proffer which was never challenged 
by Appellant and is a proper basis for the award of attorney's 
fees to Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Whether The Award of Attorney's Fees Was Based Upon Proper 
Evidence. 
The proffer of evidence or testimony when accepted by 
the opposing party was accepted by the Court as though the same 
were given under oath and subject to cross-examination. (Tr. p. 
310.) In the present case, Appellant accepted the proffer, 
waived any right to cross-examination, entered no evidence of his 
own and the Court entered its Order based upon that proffer. 
(Tr. p. 310.) 
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The Court properly exercised its discretion in awarding 
attorney's fees to Appellee making appropriate findings that the 
attorney's fees were reasonable, that Appellant had need of 
assistance to pay those fees and that Appellant had the ability 
to pay the fees awarded. (Tr. p. 310.) 
II. Whether The Findings As to Appellants Income Are 
Appropriate. 
Appellant voluntarily changed his employment. The 
voluntary incurring of debt, change of employment or voluntary 
decrease in income is not a basis for a finding of substantial 
change of circumstances. AuerJbach v. AuerJbach, 571 P. 2d 1349 
(Utah, 1977). 
The Court found Appellant's income had not 
substantially changed nor had appellant substantially changed his 
own standard of living. Considering the portion of his wife's 
income was applicable to him, his income was substantially the 
same as in 1990. Finding that there was not a substantial change 
of circumstances, the Court denied the Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce. 
Appellant must demonstrate that Facts are clearly 
erroneous by marshalling all evidence supporting the findings and 
then demonstrating that the findings are not supported by legally 
sufficient evidence. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Utah 
App. 1995); Rules of Civ. Proc. Rule 52(a). Appellant has failed 
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to demonstrate any facts that would demonstrate that there was a 
substantial change of circumstances as to Appellant's income. 
III. Whether The Parties Anticipated Appellee's Employment. 
At the time of Hearing for Decree, Appellee was 
anticipating employment. At the time the Decree was entered 
Appellee was employed part-time. The parties knew that she would 
have to be employed if she was going to survive. Alimony of $300 
per month as agreed would not sustain Appellee at the lifestyle 
she enjoyed during marriage. Appellee's income has only 
increased by a small amount since the time the Decree was entered 
and has not reached any level that would indicate a change of 
circumstances not anticipated by the parties. The Court of 
Appeals, in Moore v. Moore, 872 P.2d 1054 (Utah App. 1994), held 
that a former wife's stable income was not a change in 
circumstances justifying a modification of alimony where the 
parties expected at the time of decree that the wife would 
continue to work. 
The change of value of property, the acquiring of a 
home, assistance from Appellee's children does not alter nor 
change the circumstances anticipated by the parties at the Decree 
of Divorce. (Tr. pp. 276-277.) Appellant would be required to 
show a decrease in his own standard of living or an increase in 
Appellee's standard of living from that enjoyed during marriage. 
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Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 36 (Utah App. 1994). Appellant fails to 
demonstrate any change in the standard of living of either party. 
IV. Whether Appellee Should Continue To Receive Alimony. 
In order for this Court to find a proper basis to 
decrease or terminate alimony, the Court must find, first, that 
there is a substantial change of circumstances and, second, that 
the change of circumstances was not anticipated by the parties at 
the time of the Decree of Divorce. Moore v. Moore, 872 P.2d 1054 
(Utah, 1994); Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Utah, 1994); and Wells 
v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah, 1994); Larsen v. Larsen, 888 P.2d 
719 (Utah App. 1994). 
It is only after the Court finds a substantial change 
of circumstances and that that change was not anticipated at the 
time of the decree that the Court may consider the financial 
condition and the financial needs of the parties involved. 
This Court has held "We will not disturb a trial 
court's ruling on alimony as long as the court exercises its 
discretion within the bounds and under the standards we have set 
and has supported its decision with adequate findings and 
conclusions." Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991) 
(quoting Naranjo v. Naranjo, 75 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988) . 
The same standard for review as to an award of attorney's fees 
was approved in Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah App. 1995) . 
V. Whether Appellants Wife's Income Was Properly Considered. 
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The Court found that appellant's wife's income as a 
team long-haul driver with him was at least in part based upon 
Appellant's experience and expertise. 
In addition, the Court found that payment of expenses 
and per diem were in part income to Appellant. 
The facts being clearly substantiated, the Court did 
not erroneously apply those facts to the circumstances of 
Appellant's income imputing a portion of his wife's income to 
Appellant. 
QUESTION [to Appellant]: And is it to 
your benefit to have your wife as a team 
member as opposed to some third party? 
ANSWER: Yes it is. 
QUESTION: Is it to your financial 
benefit for the two of you to keep the truck 
going 24 hours a day if you can? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
(Tr. pp. 478-479.) 
VI. Whether Appellant Has The Ability To Pay Alimony. 
At the time of divorce, Appellant stipulated and agreed 
to pay alimony of $3 00 per month. The Court found that amount to 
be very conservative based upon the disparate income of the 
parties and well within the ability of Appellant to pay based 
upon his annual income of $36,000 plus an amount imparted from 
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his wife's income which income together reached a level of 
$75,000 per year. 
An award of alimony should be reversed only if it 
represents clear and prejudicial absence of discretion. Crompton 
v. Crompton, 888 P.2d 686 (Utah App. 1994). 
VII. Award Of Attorney's Fees On Appeal. 
Generally, when the trial court awards attorneys' fees 
in a divorce action to a party who then prevails on appeal, that 
party will also be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees on 
appeal. Utah Code Ann. 1953 30-3-3; Larsen v. Larsen, 888 P.2d 
719 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
Appeal should be dismissed as to every issue and 
Appellee should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
incurred as awarded in the proceedings below 
DATED this <d?^ > day of Getter, 1995. 
M. Byron Wisher 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Appellee 
^ZMZ^7 
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